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The National Treatment Clause, Article 1102 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, protects foreign investors from discrimination, including expropriation of 
their investments. This national treatment approach – equal treatment of foreign 
investors and local investors by states – was developed to encourage investment in 
Europe after the Second World War. Over the course of fifty years, the approach has 
evolved to provide foreign investors with protections over and above those provided to 
domestic investors. This article discusses the evolution of national treatment 
approaches, from affording foreign investors equal treatment to ensuring new 
investment conditions in international trade. 
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Introduction 
One major condition for American support for the Rome Treaty was a 
European guarantee of “national treatment” for the European subsidiaries 
of American multinational corporations – that is, the assurance that an 
American-owned subsidiary would be treated equally with the national 
firms of the European countries. The importance of this policy … for the 
European expansion of American corporations cannot be overemphasized.  
Robert Gilpin
1 
his quotation from Robert Gilpin hints at the historical foundations of legal 
theory surrounding national treatment. After the Second World War, 
multinational corporations based in the United States found an opportunity to invest in 
European national restructuring. However, due to protectionist policies of the host 
European states, the United States required assurances that its corporations would 
have equal access to valuable contracts. Thus, a national treatment political-legal 
policy was founded on the premises of reciprocity and non-discrimination for U.S. 
investment projects in the face of European protectionist corporate interests. One 
important aspect of this policy was institutional neutrality. Independent institutions 
would allocate resources or adjudicate disputes without bias toward state-controlled 
enterprises or national industry, upholding the investment rights of foreign 
corporations equally with those of domestic corporations. The American objective was 
to create a system where foreign investment could take place based on principles of 
fair and open competition between the foreign-owned enterprises and the local 
enterprises. The European states would gain American innovation and resource 
management while furthering their national agendas for redevelopment. 
This article chronicles how approaches to national treatment have evolved over 
the past fifty years. These approaches have been influenced by socio-political events 
that have led to new and emerging legal conditions that affect American investment in 
foreign states; in particular, they have been influenced by cases where a host country 
realizes the profitability of the investor-owned enterprise and expropriates the 
investment. The legal remedy that has emerged in response to such cases is the 
creation of legal expropriation standards and their inclusion in international trade 
agreements. The future of national treatment will depend upon a state or states 
imposing conditions on trade that will ensure corporate justice and on the host states 
accepting those conditions to further capital investment. 
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An Evolving Standard of National Treatment 
ational treatment is a political value that is manifested to a greater or lesser 
extent in the legal relationship between a host state where the investment occurs 
and the foreign corporation that has invested there. The host sovereign state, as a 
political entity, executes policy to advance the welfare of the state. To this effect, 
governments may intervene in free economic transactions or in the workings of 
institutions in order to serve the social public agenda. Requests for national treatment 
seek to mitigate the effects of such intervention on the legal/social relationship 
between the foreign investor and the host state. National treatment is thus 
compromised when the state directly intervenes with private enterprise in a way that 
discriminates against the foreign investor.  
The following case study provides an example of such a state intervention, 
specifically, unjust expropriation of a foreign direct investment. In 1971 the Allende 
government in Chile expropriated the assets of the (American) International 
Telephone and Telegraph, Inc. (ITT) company, a profitable firm that extracted and 
processed copper, an important natural resource for Chile.
2 The government faced 
political pressure to self-manage its natural resources, and thus it expropriated the 
assets of the corporation.
3 The political objective was to assert state sovereignty over 
the natural resource producing the greatest source of national revenue. The profits 
gained would fund national development projects as well as secure the Chilean 
Governments’ political future. The Chilean government’s compensation to ITT was 
deemed drastically inadequate – a classic example of obsolescent bargaining theory.
4  
The government of Chile breached national treatment by not permitting ITT a 
judicial forum in which to advocate its right to continue its operations and create a 
return on investment. In response, the Nixon Administration in the United States 
amended its working definition of national treatment to include just compensation in 
the event of expropriation.
5 The absence of a judicial forum in which to seek just 
compensation for expropriation led to changes in other provisions related to national 
treatment. The United States would no longer permit foreign investment in a state that 
did not respect the principle of fair compensation in cases of expropriation; further, 
the United States also created a forum to settle related disputes.
6  
Issues related to national treatment in cases of expropriation compensation are far 
from resolved. Venezuela has a long history of state intervention with American oil 
companies.
7 In 2005, the Chavez government was commencing policy to expropriate 
up to a 51 percent share in the investor oil companies, in effect nationalizing these 
foreign institutions.
8 The chance that the Chavez government would compensate the 
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oil companies at fair market value was deemed very unlikely, forcing foreign investors 
to negotiate the value of expropriated assets.
9 
When a host country expropriates the assets of foreign investors (affecting return 
on investment) without just compensation, the country that is home to the investing 
corporations will impose legal conditions of investment. International trade 
agreements presently address this concern by imposing domestic expropriation 
standards. The appropriateness and scope of these standards demonstrate an evolution 
of national treatment standards.  
NAFTA 
rticle 1102 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), titled 
“National Treatment”, provides that treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to domestic enterprises shall be accorded by sovereign signatory states with 
regard to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation 
and sale or other disposition of private investments made by foreign investors.
10 
Further, the agreement holds that a state cannot require an investor of another party to 
the treaty, by reason of its nationality, to sell or otherwise dispose of an investment in 
the territory of the first party. In addition, Article 1110 states that 
[n]o Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure 
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment 
(“expropriation”) ….
11 
Even the exceptions provided in the NAFTA do not excuse state compensation for 
expropriation of investor assets. According to the same article, expropriation is 
permitted under the following circumstances: for a public purpose; on a non-
discriminatory basis; in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and 
on payment of compensation in accordance with the agreement.
12 If there is a finding 
of expropriation, compensation is required, even if the taking is for a public purpose, 
non-discriminatory and in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1).
13 
Therefore, the more arbitrary or discriminatory the measure that takes an investor’s 
business without providing compensation, the more likely that there is a breach of 
Article 1110.
14 
In its original European context, national treatment meant that the foreign 
enterprise was to be treated equally and without bias by government or other 
institutions. Under the NAFTA, national treatment is qualified, limiting the ability of a 
foreign state to dispose of an investment or nationalize or expropriate an investment or 
to undertake any activity tantamount to that effect, and effectively guaranteeing 
compensation for legitimate expropriation policies. Therefore, it offers special 
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treatment of foreign investment notwithstanding the fact this protection is unavailable 
to domestic investors. 
Article 1130 of the NAFTA provides a method of dispute resolution under 
international arbitration rules, and Article 1131 specifies the authority of a tribunal for 
investment claims.
15 Again, while classic national treatment provides that the foreign 
investor will be treated equally and fairly in the jurisdiction of foreign legal 
institutions, Chapter 11 of the NAFTA provides for a separate judicial jurisprudence 
and forum and specific conditions of national treatment for investments in Mexico or 
Canada.
16 The reason for this provision is that the Mexican judicial system was known 
to be corrupt and non-transparent, thus negating the objectives of fair and equal 
treatment of foreign investors. This creation of a separate forum follows the premise 
that if a state judicial system does not or cannot hear and address the concerns of a 
minority group, that group may seek judicial remedy in a foreign jurisdiction.
17 In this 
case, the minority group is the corporate interests and the foreign jurisdiction is an 
international dispute resolution tribunal.  
The legislative objective of the NAFTA National Treatment clause is to provide 
just compensation to foreign investors in cases of state expropriation. This legal right 
is not provided for domestic enterprises. It is ironic that a legal tool created to provide 
equal protection to foreign investors in fact discriminates in favour of the foreign 
investors. All companies are equal, but some are more equal than others. If the United 
States can impose conditions that its companies must be given more favourable 
treatment than domestic enterprises with regard to expropriation, what other 
conditions could be invoked under the cause of national treatment? 
Premise of Normative Intervention 
nited States Chief Justice Rehnquist’s article “Constructing the State: 
Extraterritoriality: Jurisdictional Disclosure, the National Interest, and 
Transitional Norms” uses an academic argument to justify the assertion that one state 
jurisdiction may impose conditions on other sovereign states.
18 States are usually 
permitted to impose policy if the act/matter is within the borders of the state or, under 
the passive personality principle, the act/matter involves a national citizen. Justice 
Rehnquist introduces a third possible ground for jurisdictional intervention: a state 
may regulate outside its borders and citizens if the matter is of compelling national 
interest and within hostis humani generis (common enemy of humankind) – thus 
imposing universal justice.
19 To elaborate, a foreign state applies regulatory justice for 
the common good when the host state cannot administer such justice. What constitutes 
universal justice, however, is a subjective decision made by the regulatory state. 
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The premise of normative intervention has led to further evolution of national 
treatment. It permits one state to impose equal to preferable treatment of its investors 
in another state in cases where it can be argued that such treatment is to remedy a 
potential breach of universal justice. When universal rights cannot be upheld in a 
foreign judicial system, the investor seeks a remedy from its home state. The Nixon 
amendment and the NAFTA both follow this argument by imposing conditions on 
expropriation in order to maintain and protect private property rights where justice 
would not (or could not) be administered. 
Where Next for National Treatment? 
lthough the national treatment conditions imposed by an investor state may 
seem appropriate in certain circumstances, how far can such conditions extend 
under the cause of “universal justice”? The rise in importance of certain trading 
nations and trading blocs may mean that the conditions that define national treatment 
will evolve from dealing with the issues surrounding expropriation to a point where 
they include other international normative values as well.  
Historically, the conditions of international trade were imposed only by those 
states with the diplomatic and economic capacity to do so. The United States, as a 
hegemonic economic trading state, continues to impose conditions on trade and 
investment, resulting in equal to more favourable treatment of its investors by host 
states. With the emergence of new trading blocs (i.e., China, India and the European 
Union), conditions relating to national treatment may no longer be set by the United 
States alone.  
Labour standards are prime examples of normative values that may be applied as 
conditions of national treatment. As with expropriation remedies, labour standards 
could be liberally argued as imposing universal “humanitarian” justice. The European 
Union includes labour standards in accession contracts to the trading union,
20 meaning 
that labour standards are a condition of trading with other European states. Making 
such standards a condition of national treatment could play an important role in 
democratization, workers’ health, wealth redistribution and living standards – essential 
factors of national development for the host country. However, imposing such 
conditions on emerging trading blocs may no longer be feasible, due to reciprocal 
imposition of trade conditions. 
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Conclusion 
ational treatment foreign policy was created to ensure fair, just and open 
investment options for national and corporate development. It has been 
amended to ensure that financial property interests (and thus return on investment) are 
protected and property rights enforced by fair and just legal institutions, thus 
maintaining the existence of the corporate entity. The next evolution of this foreign 
policy may extend the conditions of national treatment to include aspects of social 
development. On an economic basis, social development may be perceived as a 
comparative disadvantage, a slippery slope of national treatment conditions arrived at 
on international normative grounds. The slope may draw down to a total withdrawal 
of all conditions and a situation where corporations would have to carefully analyze 
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